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Forthcoming in: D. MacKenzie, F. Muniesa and L. Siu (Eds.), Do Economists Make 





"L'homo œconomicus n'est pas derrière nous, il est devant 
nous ; comme l'homme de la morale et du devoir ; comme l'homme de 
la science et de la raison.  L'homme a été très longtemps autre chose ; 
et il n'y a pas bien longtemps qu'il est une machine, compliquée d'une 
machine à calculer"1
(Mauss 1960, p.272) 
 
"Economists have long recognized the importance of 
technological innovation for economic growth; however, economists 
have generally studied only such contributions of the physical sciences, 
overlooking the fact that economics itself has been the source of a 
surprising number of inventions.  "
(Faulhaber and Baumol 1988, p. 577)
 
 
                                                 
1 "Homo oeconomicus is not behind us, he is ahead of us: like the moral and dutiful person; like the 
person of science and of reason.  The person has long been something else, and only recently has the 
person been a machine, complicated by a calculator" (my translation). 
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Faulhaber and Baumol's Quandary 
In 1988 economists Gerald Faulhaber and William Baumol raised a question 
similar to the one that I raised in The Laws of the Markets (Callon 1998).2  In their 
piece entitled "Economists as Innovators: Practical Products of Theoretical Research", 
they indicated their intention to "determine how much economists have in fact 
contributed to the flow of innovation used in business and government and to judge 
what this evidence implies about the degree of validity of the standard optimization 
premise." (Faulhaber and Baumol 1998, p. 580).    
 
To this end, Faulhaber and Baumol selected nine noteworthy innovations 
(marginal analysis; the use of net present value for capital budgeting; peak load 
pricing; econometric forecasting; the portfolio selection model and the associated beta 
coefficient and duration analysis; the Black-Scholes option pricing model; Ramsey 
pricing; and the stand alone cost test) and studied their history from origins to (non) 
adoption and diffusion, treating these innovations produced by economics, like any 
other scientific or technological innovation.  
  
Their results were "mixed." While economics did play a part in the conception 
of innovations, it was less important than they had anticipated.  Economics seldom 
acts alone and is rarely a driver of invention.  The classification they provide of their 
results shows these findings clearly:  
 
a) cases in which economists provided the actual invention and may have 
contributed to the innovation process (e.g., econometric techniques, duration, 
beta, stand-alone costs)  
                                                 
2 This paper has been prepared during my stay as an invited member at the International Center for 
Advanced Studies (NYU).  I benefited greatly from Tim Mitchell's insights and support. I thank all the 
participants in the 2004-2005 ICAS seminar, and in particular Koray Caliskan, Julie Graham, Vincent 
Lépinay, Fred Myers and Steven Lukes for their comments and criticism.  I am also grateful to Donald 
MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa and Bruno Latour for their suggestions and to Martha Poon for her 
cautious reading. 
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b) cases in which economists helped in the innovation process, though the 
idea was initially contributed by others (e.g., discounted present value, 
Ramsey pricing)  
c) cases in which economists provided an optimality formula for a 
concept previously introduced by others in an imperfect and intuitive version 
(e.g., peak-load pricing)  
d) cases in which economists acted primarily as disseminators of the ideas 
of others (marginal analysis) (Faulhaber and Baumol 1988 p.580). 
 
This mixed conclusion clearly put Faulhaber and Baumol in a quandary. On 
the one hand, like many of their colleagues, they were convinced that economics does 
not have to make any contribution whatsoever to the economy in order to justify its 
existence. On the other, they were concerned about economic agents' lack of interest 
in economists' work.  
 
If Faulhaber and Baumol were uneasy about their results, it is first because 
they had shown that economics (in its most theoretical form) plays a secondary or 
even tertiary role in innovation. Even the best economists are often content to relay or 
to rediscover inventions produced by others and they sometimes completely fail to 
impose their most original views, as they did in the case of marginal analysis, one of 
the cornerstones of neo-classical theory.  Economics may be useful but it acts simply 
as an additional force!  In this view, skeptics might see economists as mere parasites, 
common ideologists or vile mercenaries in the pay of wicked capitalists.   
 
If Faulhaber and Baumol's quandary was due only to what they consider as an 
unexpectedly weak contribution of economics, it would be easy enough to reassure 
them.  Having dared to treat economics like any other science and to question its 
contribution to economic life, they have fallen victims of the theory of innovation that 
they chose to use. According to that theory, innovation is seen as a linear process 
(researchÆ inventionÆ developmentÆ innovationÆ diffusion), in which basic 
research can play only one part: a necessarily episodic role in which it is the source of 
major innovations.  
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The linear view of technological change has recently been superseded by a 
non-linear conceptual model featuring feedback loops emanating from each stage 
(Kline and Rosenberg 1986). In this alternative model, basic science can fit into the 
process of innovation at any stage.  Moreover, he very idea of a source or an origin 
point of technology is misleading because innovation is an emergent, interactive 
activity.  It involves many actors who cooperate or oppose one another (Akrich, 
Callon and Latour 2002).  Science and scientists – and especially economics and 
economists – are no exception.  Considered from the point of view of the interactive 
and iterative model, the four trajectories identified by Faulhaber and Baumol no 
longer demonstrate the weakness of economics' contributions.  To the contrary, what 
they confirm is the variety of possible contributions economics can make to the 
economy, as well as its constant presence in technological change. If we take the 
interactive and iterative model of innovation and apply it to economics, economics' 
contribution to the economy becomes significant and diverse because, as Faulhaber 
and Baumol's case studies show, there have been few innovations in which it has not 
been involved at some stage in one way or another.  
 
We could stop there and be content with developing a sociology of economic 
innovations based on the interactive model, one that gives a more accurate and more 
balanced view of the contribution of economics to the economy.  But that would only 
partially solve Faulhaber's and Baumol's quandary since they are tormented, not only 
by the (supposed) weakness of economics' contribution to the economy, but also by a 
real epistemological concern.  Is it reasonable to consider that a scientific theory can 
alter the nature of the object that it describes?  Can economics act on the behavior of 
real economic agents, which it claims to analyze objectively and from a distance?  
Wouldn't this be tantamount to claming that physics and physicists are able to 
influence the laws governing the course of planets?  
  
These sorts of objections clearly worry the authors.  They have them in mind 
when they clarify the criteria by which they selected the innovations in their study: 
"We explicitly focus on innovations whose value to those who adopt them is the 
promise of improvement in their own economic performance in coping with market 
forces" (Faulhaber and Baumol 1988, p. 577).  Faulhaber and Baumol chose 
innovations that were compatible with the model of rational agents capable of 
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deciding what would provide them with a competitive advantage; in short, 
innovations that markets and agents should have invented and would eventually have 
invented on their own.  For Faulhaber and Baumol economic theory can play a role in 
accelerating the processes that it sets out to describe but it cannot change their course.  
 
When, addressing the issue of the epistemological status of economic 
knowledge, Faulhaber and Baumol present two different conceptions of relationships 
between economics and its object (the economy).  In the first economists are inventors 
who naturally fit into the innovation process and are immersed in the economy; in the 
second they are describers (or analysts) who produce concepts, theories and tools and 
who stand back from the economy.   
 
Faulhaber and Baumol know that the majority of orthodox economists are 
fervent supporters of the second position and believe that the market, provided it is 
well organized, prompts agents to conceive of and adopt efficient behavior. The 
discovery of formulae such as that of Ramsey or of Black-Sholes does not change 
behavior; it describes and clarifies it, just as Newton's laws have not changed the 
behavior of falling apples: "Yet strong believers in the market will be skeptical, 
claiming that competition will force firms and agents to do what is optimal.  
Consequently, the discovery of a formula for discounting or peak-load pricing will not 
change behavior but merely describe it" (Faulhaber and Baumol 1988, p. 578).  
Economic agents don't need economists to conceive of tools and to choose the right 
behavior.  When they use economics, it is because economists correctly describe what 
will necessarily happen – just as Newton's laws anticipate any trajectory of any bodies 
in any field of gravitational forces: Basically, for an efficient market, economics is a 
futile luxury.   
 
The opposition between scientists as describers and scientists as innovators is 
not peculiar to markets or institutions.  It runs through all the disciplines and the 
philosophy of science, with those who think that theories simply mirror reality on the 
one hand and those who believe that they can represent reality only by intervening on 
and transforming it on the other (Hacking 1983).   
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The reader can sense that Faulhaber and Baumol believe more in the thesis of 
inventors-innovators than in that of describers. If they fail to state their preferences 
explicitly, it is because they are aware of the weakness of their positions.  Describers 
dominate economics.  Moreover, no proof, no crucial experience allows the two 
positions to be separated in the short term.  In several cases Faulhaber and Baumol – 
as if they were inspired by a sociology of science à la Feyerabend– concede that it is 
impossible for them to prove that the use of a formula or a new calculating tool (for 
instance the use of a discounting technique that allows calculation of the payment 
necessary to reimburse a debt earlier than planned) affords a competitive advantage 
for the agents who adopt it, because: "ceteris are never paribus (sic)" (Faulhaber and 
Baumol 1988, p. 578).  At another point, even though they are sure of having shown 
that Black-Scholes' formula really did contribute to changes of behaviors and markets 
– and in a way that markets, left to themselves, would have been incapable of 
imagining – they observe that some of their colleagues will object. These colleagues 
will argue that the well-known thesis of beauty contests or self-fulfilling prophecies is 
enough to explain the effects of the adoption of this tool.  The equation per se has no 
impact; it simply acts as a convention, a common belief that guarantees the 
coordination of actors in a situation of uncertainty.   
 
Aware that the balance of power is not in their favor, Faulhaber and Baumol 
downplay the importance of their observations.  Yet this does not prevent them from 
developing killing arguments against an extreme version of the expectation that the 
market will always get it right.  Since the market, simply by its force, is seen as 
capable of causing actors to innovate, Faulhaber and Baumol rightly say that it ought 
to have driven firms, on their own, to find the electric, chemical or biological 
techniques that guarantee them a competitive advantage. Whereas the history of 
science and technology shows the opposite: "First, if the market is always able to 
force surviving firms to anticipate correctly (if implicitly) the behavior called for by 
as yet unborn economists, why does it not work in the case of engineers and physicists 
also unborn?" (Faulhaber and Baumol 1988, p. 579). Without assistance, economic 
agents are not able to produce of all the innovations that will guarantee them a 
competitive advantage.  They need chemists, physicists or biologists working in 
universities. So why treat economists, who profess to be scientists in their own right, 
any differently from others of their kind?   
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If Faulhaber and Baumol refuse to answer this question clearly it is because 
they feel that it might introduce a difficulty that is peculiar to economics.  To an open-
minded economist it poses no problem that chemistry, physics or biology participate 
in the construction of markets and their functioning because these disciplines say 
nothing and have nothing to say about economic markets. As such, they can take part 
in the economy because their object is unrelated to it.  Economics is not so fortunate.  
By participating in the economy, it would place itself within the object that it is 
supposed to be studying from the outside, and it would thus run the risk of corrupting 
or distorting that object.  To maintain the parallel with the natural sciences, we need to 
ask what would happen to chemistry, physics or biology if they were to participate in 
the constitution of the "natural" objects that they are purported to describe.   
 
My thesis is that both the natural and life sciences, along with the social 
sciences, contribute towards enacting the realities that they describe (Law and Urry 
2004).  The concept of performativity affords a way out of the apparent paradox of 
this statement.  Without performativity we would be destined to sharing Faulhaber 
and Baumol's quandary.  We would have no alternative but to acknowledge 
economist-describers' point of view.  We would have to settle for a comfortable but 
rather boring life offered by academic ivory towers.   
 
Performativity: Truth as Success  
How can a discourse be outside of the reality that it describes and 
simultaneously participate in the construction of that reality as an object by acting on 
it?  To this paradoxical question the concept of performativity provides a convincing 
and general answer.   
 
My intention here is not to enter into the details of the debates surrounding this 
concept.  Yet I cannot continue to settle for a metaphoric use and for the accurate but 
elliptical definition I gave in The Laws of the Markets.  A discourse is indeed 
performative, as I suggested there, if it contributes to the construction of the reality 
that it describes, but we need to go further than that and at least briefly turn towards 
discourse analysis to understand the meaning of the verb "to contribute."  The idea is 
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to assess the extent to which the concept of performativity, which implies that any 
discourse acts on its object, applies to science in general and to economics in 
particular.   
 
The Pragmatic Turn 
Since the Ancient Greeks, reflection on language has been organized around 
the dissociation between logic and rhetoric.  While logic questions the conditions of 
the verisimilitude of statements through an analysis of propositions and their 
sequence; rhetoric - the prerogative of sophists and rhetoricians- disregards the 
question of truth and apprehends discourse as a producer of effects, a power of 
intervention in the real.  Logic implies the existence of an outside world, populated by 
entities that are distinct and cut off from the propositions referring to them.  The 
ontology of the world of logic is set and independent of the discourses describing it.  
Rhetoric, on the other hand, implies relationships of entanglement between 
propositions and their referents; it acts on the ontology of the entities to which it 
refers.  Science obviously seems to be on the side of logic and exteriority (an electron 
is an electron, irrespective of what one says about it), while politics is on the side of 
rhetoric (the identity and missions of the USA depend on what is said about them).  
 
It has always been difficult to establish an impervious division between these 
different modalities of the functioning of discourse.  The two ways constantly 
interfere with each other, as in the so-called Port-Royal logic in which considerations 
of a strictly rhetorical order are introduced alongside purely logical developments.  
 
"If we say to someone that they have lied, and we consider only the 
main meaning of the phrase, it is as if we told them that they knew the 
opposite of what they had said.  But apart from the main meaning, these words 
convey an (accessory) idea of contempt, which makes them insulting." 
(Arnauld and Nicole 1970 {1662}). 
 
In this extract the notion of an accessory idea denotes that which, along with 
the propositional content of a discourse, constitutes what was later called its 
illocutionary force – in this case its value as an insult.  The mere fact of saying: "You 
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have lied" is at once a statement, a description of the state of the world (which may be 
true or false) and an act through which the enunciator acts on the enunciatee (the 
receiver) of the statement (by insulting him or her).3  
  
Despite these theories and observations, which show the difficulty of 
separating logic from rhetoric, the interlocutory dimension of language has always 
been considered as located at the periphery of logic.  It was only with the rise of 
pragmatics that the gap was reduced.  There is pragmatics as soon as one gives up the 
separation between the grammatical structure of the discourse and its use.  The use of 
language is not added to a theoretically self-sufficient statement from the outside.  C. 
Morris has noted, for example, that any language has a syntax (relations between 
signs), semantics (relationships between the signs and what they denote), and 
pragmatics4 (relation between signs and their use context), which cannot be entirely 
dissociated from one another (Morris 1938).  There is no discourse without a speaker 
and an audience, and no communication without well-formulated sentences and well-
articulated concepts.  On the basis of these distinctions, several positions seem 
possible.  From a minimalist point of view we can consider that pragmatics is one 
component of linguistics among others (along with syntax and semantics), or else 
adopt a maximalist point of view and argue that nothing in linguistic phenomena can 
escape pragmatics.  
 
Austin's decisive contribution is to have shown, or at least to have suggested, 
that the very idea of a separation between these dimensions is impossible and that 
only the maximalist position is defendable.  Austin's work is interesting precisely 
because he starts with a distinction between those statements that describe the worlds 
to which they refer, and those that act on those worlds and help to make them exist.  
This is his famous distinction between constative utterances (the cat is on the mat; the 
                                                 
3  The opposite is also true.  The best specialists of rhetoric (Perelman 1982) have pointed out its close 
relations with logic.  The notion of demonstration, useful to both the rhetor and the scientist, serves to 
understand the articulation of these two dimensions of discourse (Barry 2001; Rosental 2002). 
Moreover Cassin (1995) shows how the epideixis (through which the speaker tries to convince his or 
her audience) is always articulated to the apodeixis (by which the speaker indicates and qualifies the 
objects to which he or she is referring). 
4 Pragmatics derives from pragma: action; a deed or intentional act. 
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structure of DNA is a double helix; in the prisoner's dilemma rational agents choose 
suboptimal configurations) and performative utterances ("I promise," "I baptize you," 
"I sentence you to ten years' imprisonment," "I marry you").  In the former the object 
is the outside world; the latter cause the reality that they describe to exist (e.g. being 
married is the consequence of an act of language).  By proposing this distinction and 
showing the diversity and large number of purely performative statements, Austin 
wanted to criticize the idea that the function of language is essentially representative.  
But, in attempting to make this distinction more precise and profound, he seriously 
considered concluding that all utterances are performative (or illocutionary) and that it 
is impossible to maintain the hypothesis of the existence of pure constative 
utterances.5   
 
The Semiotic Turn 
According to Austin, because it is uttered (what is called enunciation), there is 
no statement that does not constitute the context in which it functions.: there is no 
language; there are only acts of language.  Phrased in Greimassian terminology: to 
have meaning a statement implies its context of enunciation (at least an enunciator 
and an enunciatee) (Greimas and Courtès 1982).  Although Austin was not explicitly 
referring to scientific discourse, there is no reason to exclude science from the general 
rule as we will see.  Scientific theories, models and statements are not constative; they 
are performative, that is, actively engaged in the constitution of the reality that it 
describes. 
 
To explain the scope and reasons for this assertion, that all science is 
performative, which some would consider scandalous, we can conveniently begin 
with the distinction between universal and singular statements.  For its clarity and 
precision I prefer to adopt Popper's terminology here, and will refer to singular 
existential statements (SES) and universal statements (US).6   
                                                 
5 In his twelfth lecture, Austin says that “Stating, describing, are just two names among a very great 
many others for illocutionary acts” (Austin 1962, pp. 147-48). 
6 The obvious limit of Austin's work is that his analysis does not depart from discourse per se, as his 
work on the different categories of verbs and performativities shows. Consequently, he can explain 
neither the force of statements nor their meaning. These limits have led certain authors to complete the 
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SESs can be found in all of the scientific disciplines.  An SES is characterized 
by its indexicality: it explicitly refers to particular circumstances, singular entities 
located in time and space.7  For instance, "At such-and-such a place, at such-and-such 
a time, such-and-such a thread can be observed, that breaks when we apply such-and-
such a force over x kilograms."  This statement describes the existence of an event 
(the thread breaks) whose spatio-temporal coordinates are provided (the event is 
observable at a particular time and place) and whose operating mode is indicated.  
One of the characteristics of  SESs is that they contain what semioticians call 
"shifters",  words in the statement which refer (or shift) to situations, contexts or 
operations that can be described and observed.  In the example given , the statement 
includes phrases such as: at such-and-such a place, at such-and-such a time.  The 
statement also indicates precise devices, operators and operating modes which are not 
directly described but have to be describable (for instance through the addition of 
other statements that complete the SES and clarify what it implies).  In other words, 
the statement contains its own context.8   
 
The epistemological question concerning the conditions under which the 
observation is considered as valid  and  the mechanisms through which witnesses are 
convinced, as well as the equally epistemological question concerning  relationships 
between the SES and other US (for example of the type: "threads subjected to a force 
                                                                                                                                            
Austinian analysis, either by highlighting the importance of the interlocutors' subjectivity (as Grice and 
Searle for philosophy or Butler for sociology do) or by noting the need to take social and cultural 
context into account (Bourdieu). But these critiques simply continued Austin's error by accepting an 
insurmountable boundary between discourse and that which lies beyond it (either in the form of the 
psychology of subjects or of society). To extend Austin, we have to go in another direction and 
question the actualization of the contexts and subjectivities that are implied by the utterance. In the case 
of science, this implies the study of the relationships between SES and socio-technical arrangements 
(agencements). The critique of Austin should not exclude the notion of performativity but rather should 
enrich and complete it, first by insisting more on the fact that the context of enunciation is included in 
the enunciation (semiotic turn) and, second, by taking into account the materialities composing that 
context (ANT turn). 
7 An SES perfectly illustrates the thesis of Cassin in terms of which any discourse articulates epideixis 
and apodeixis (sees note 3). 
8 Shifters are traces or marks of the enunciation. They point to the world presupposed by the utterance. 
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exceeding their breaking strength will break") are of no interest , even if they have 
fuelled fierce controversies.9  The only thing that matters here is that in a scientific 
theory or model there is necessarily a place for SESs.  There is no science without the 
possibility of formulating statements that describe singular events localized in time 
and space, and no science without describable socio-technical devices that produce 
events described by singular statements.  
 
This implies that the verisimilitude of the statement (i.e. does the event occur 
or not?) cannot be dissociated from the context denoted by and built into the 
statement.  The SES is not a statement outside the world or worlds to which it refers; 
it requires that very world.  Conversely, the world to which it refers is meaningless 
without the statement that puts it into action.  A thread on which a weight is hung and 
which breaks is not an intelligible and interpretable event; under no circumstances can 
it be associated with a scientific fact if it is not, at least, accompanied and framed by 
the singular existential statement announcing that its breaking stress has been 
exceeded.10 The SES is entangled with the device that produced what it describes; the 
device and the series of actions undertaken are shaped by the statement, and vice-
versa.  
 
Last Turn: The ANT Turn 
To understand the strange relations of exteriority and interiority, that are 
implied by the semiotic turn consider as an example, a set of operating instructions 
and the device to which they refer (Akrich 1992).  Without the material device the 
operating instructions are meaningless: the gaze needs to constantly shift from one to 
the other.  Likewise, the machine without the instructions is likely to be opaque, 
unusable and passive.  At the heart of science lies this two-way relationship between 
description and action.  When I say: "this thread breaks", I am referring to all the 
actions that cause the break in the thread and that cause my statement to be true, to 
actually happen (or not).  It is because the statement describes a singular course of 
action still to happen – and not a preexisting word out there – that it is performative.  
                                                 
9 See Callon (1994).  
10 This is what epistemology highlights when it asserts that facts are always theory-laden. 
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A scientific statement can be compared to the instructions for use (that is, for action) 
with which we grapple when we try to get a VCR to function.   
 
This helps to explain why I prefer to refer to the relationships between 
statements and their worlds as socio-technical agencements.11 The term agencement is 
a French word that has no exact English counterpart. In French its meaning is very 
close to "arrangement" (or "assemblage"). It conveys the idea of a combination of 
heterogeneous elements that have been carefully adjusted one another.  But 
arrangements (as well as assemblages) could imply a sort of divide between human 
agents (those who arrange or assemble) and things that have been arranged. This is 
why Deleuze and Guattari (1998) proposed the notion of agencement. Agencement 
has the same root as agency: agencements are arrangements endowed with the 
capacity of acting in different ways depending on their configuration.  This  means 
that there is nothing left outside agencements: there is no need for further explanation, 
because the construction of its meaning is part of an agencement.  A socio-technical 
agencement includes the statement[s] pointing to it, and it is because the former 
includes the latter  that the agencement acts in line with the statement, just as the 
operating instructions are part of the device and participate in making it work.  
Contexts cannot be reduced, as in semiotics, to a pure world of words and 
interlocutors: they are better conceived as textual and material assemblages (Latour 
2005).   
 
We can now see why the concept of performativity has lead to the replacement 
of the concept of truth (or non-truth) by that of success or failure.  Donald MacKenzie 
(forthcoming) shows, for instance, that Black and Scholes' famous formula, so 
basically simple, has meaning and effect only in its own world.  MacKenzie rightly 
talks of "an equation and its worlds" (MacKenzie 2003).  One world implied by the 
equation - without which the equation would not function and which would not 
function without the equation - is a world in which prices can be observed [to] follow 
a random walk.  It is a world in which "skewnesses" (a new variable for taking into 
account non-Gaussian distributions) will later be calculated and re-injected into 
pricing formulae, a world in which software (Autoquote) will allow the production of 
                                                 
11 See Deleuze and Guattari (1998). 
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continuous quotation even for options with low liquidity It is a world which has its 
vocabulary, its evaluation criteria, a world in which the notion of implied volatility, a 
simple mathematical variable, becomes observable and calculable.  What MacKenzie 
describes with surgical precision is the gradual actualization of the world of the 
formula: a formula that progressively discovers its world and a world that is put into 
motion by the formula describing it.  A formula that previously functioned in a paper 
world, which was perfectly real (for what could be more real than paper or 
equations?), subsequently functions, after many investments, in a world of computers 
and silicon, algorithms, professional skills, and cleverly adjusted institutions.  We 
could say that the formula has become true, but it is preferable to say that the world it 
supposes has become actual.12  The supposed world has gained in precision, weight, 
robustness and extension through the intense work of articulating, experimenting and 
observing that has been required to produce the gradual, mutual adjustment of socio-
technical agencements and formulae.  The actualization process is a long sequence of 
trial and error, reconfigurations and reformulations.  But what makes this process 
possible is the performative dimension of the statements and the trials that they allow.  
For if the statement could be dissociated from the world in which it functions, if it 
could be denied as an utterance pointing or shifting to supposed worlds, no trial, 
learning or adjustment would be conceivable.  The conditions of felicity of a 
(performative) statement, that is, its success, depend on this adjustment, an adjustment 
that is never a given in advance and always requires specific investments.  
 
As MacKenzie shows in his chapter (forthcoming), at a certain point in time, 
in certain places, the world of the formula is actualized, in such a way that it can be 
said that the formula describes and represents its world correctly.  We are no longer in 
the register of truth as a reference but – to stick to the same word – in that of truth as 
success or failure, in truth as fulfilled conditions of felicity.  The formula that is born 
performative, and remains so, seems to be constative when the world (finally) acts 
                                                 
12 Deleuze has proposed distinguishing between two sets of relations he calls virtual/actual and 
potential/real. The latter refers to processes in which events could be reduced to the causal consequence 
of pre-existing configurations; the former to events that could be said to be dependant on but not 
causally determined by preexisting configurations. In one case, framing (and repetitions) prevail, 
whereas in the second case overflowing (and differences) impose their destabilizing logic (Deleuze 
1968). 
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according to it.  Yet failure can occur when events take place that are incompatible 
with the formula and its world.  Financial crisis is a crisis for the formula.  New 
adjustments are made; the formula is given a new twist (volatility skew) that translates 
into an alteration of the socio-technical agencements (dedicated professionals and 
observation tools are required to carry out the calculation of this parameter daily). 
And the game is never over, for new framings are always possible, always involving a 
bricolage of both the agencements and the statements.  This at least, is what the 
notion of performativity, enriched by the semiotic and the ANT turn, makes visible.  
 
From Self-Fulfilling Prophecies to Performation 
One of the main benefits of the notion of performativity is that it rids us of 
what Pickering calls the representational idiom (Pickering 1995) in terms of which the 
purpose of science is to create representations of reality.  But we have to go further.  
We would be wrong to sum up the debate as the opposition between performativity 
and constativity.  Many concepts are proposed, especially in this book, to describe the 
strange relations between the social sciences and their objects.  I am now going to 
discuss some of them.  This will enable me to further clarify the meaning of the notion 
of performativity.  
 
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
One way of describing the effects of economic theories on agents is through 
the notion of self-fulfilling prophecies proposed by Robert K. Merton, the father of 
the option theorist whose work is discussed MacKenzie (forthcoming).  If everyone is 
persuaded that Bank X is on the verge of bankruptcy, then to avoid being ruined, all 
of its clients will rush to withdraw their money before everyone else does and 
bankruptcy will inevitably ensue.  Likewise, if we are convinced that women do not 
have the capacities required to practice certain occupations, those occupations will 
effectively be closed to women and the assertion will be verified.  The concept of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy seems to apply to economics.  Economics – and this is where 
it derives its strength – is a constructed, logical discourse based on a number of 
irrefutable hypotheses.  As discourse it can change into a system of beliefs that 
infiltrate agents' minds and colonize them.  For example, neo-classical theory is based 
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on the idea that agents are self-interested.  If I believe this statement and if this belief 
is shared by the other agents, and I believe that they believe it, then what was simply 
an assumption turns into a reality.  Everyone ends up aligning themselves to the 
model and everyone's expectations are fulfilled by everyone else's behaviors.  To 
predict economic agents' behaviors an therefore economic theory does not have to be 
true; it simply needs to be believed by everyone.  Since the model acts as a convention 
it  can be perfectly arbitrary.  Even if the belief has no relationship with the world, the 
world ends up corresponding to it.  We can thus consider that the famous Black and 
Scholes formula has no truth value, that it says nothing of real markets, and that it is 
simply a coordination tool that allows mutual expectations.  It constitutes a false but 
effective representation, and can be seen as pure convention.  This is what Faulhauber 
and Baumol suggest in their article. 
 
Those who support the thesis of the self-fulfilling prophecy or that of 
prescription explain that if an economic model or formula can act as a convention (by 
nature arbitrary), it is because their object is human beings whose actions and 
behaviors depend entirely on their beliefs and the meanings that they attribute to the 
social world surrounding them.  Could one say that the universal law of gravity is a 
self-fulfilling prophecy?  Of course not.  We justifiably believe that it is not enough 
for human agents to behave as if they believed in the law, for it to govern the course 
of planets.  A law in 1/d3 would not become true if everyone believed in it, simply 
because celestial bodies follow their nature, irrespective of what the humans who 
observe and interact with them think and say.  In contrast, the Black-Scholes-Merton 
model can be self-fulfilling because it is all about the behaviors of human beings, and 
human beings depend on beliefs and expectations that planets do not have.  In the 
final analysis it is the humanity of human beings that allows self-fulfilling prophecies 
and, more generally, the effectiveness of conventions.  Society has thus opposed 
nature since Artistotle.  
 
This 2500-year old conception is not convincing.  The case of Black and 
Scholes equation is a typical example of the limits of the theory of self-fulfilling 
prophecies applied to the social sciences and especially economics.  Imagine, as 
MacKenzie proposes, a different formula, for instance one with a calculation error or 
a statistical incoherence.  Would it have had the same impact?  It is obviously difficult 
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to answer this question directly since no one has ever tried the experiment.  
Fortunately there is another, indirect, way of answering the question.  MacKenzie 
shows that the use of the Black and Scholes formula led to a situation of crisis that can 
be explained in a plausible way by the technical shortcomings of the formula.  These 
shortcomings amplified the crisis since the formula induced behaviors that challenged 
the distribution of the very course of action on which the formula itself was based.  To 
be sure, the Black and Scholes formula does successfully organize agents' 
coordination, at least for a certain time.  But, as the 1987 episode shows, it cannot for 
all of that be considered an (arbitrary) convention.  The content of the formula 
matters.13  The Black and Scholes formula implies a world without which it cannot 
function and the realization of that world is at stake.  Clearly, as seen above, it is not 
the formula itself that can cause that world, a socio-technical agencement, to exist.  
Other forces are involved, other interests.  It so happened that the adjustment took 
place – Donald MacKenzie explains how – for a few years, but it was unable to 
withstand the 1987 events.  This was due not to a lack of belief in the formula but to 
the incapacity of the formula to forecast the events and the behaviors they triggered.  
Whereas the notion of a self-fulfilling prophecy explains success or failure in terms of 
beliefs only, that of performativity goes beyond human minds and deploys all the 
materialities comprising the socio-technical agencements that constitute the world in 
which these agents are plunged: performativity leaves open the possibility of events 
that might refute, or even happen independently of, what humans believe or think.   
 
MacKenzie proposes the notion of counter-performativity to denote these 
failures, because in this case the formula produces behaviors that eventually 
undermine it.  This analysis applies equally to the natural sciences and to the human 
and social sciences.  What Popper called refutation is another name for counter-
performativity or what I have called overflowing.   The fact of imposing devices 
designed to realize a statement causes other worlds to proliferate in reaction to that 
                                                 
13 From this point of view, a major issue is arbitrage conceived in a socio-technical sense: see Beunza, 
Hardie, and MacKenzie (2006). Some formulae are more vulnerable than others to the counter program 
of the arbitrageur. E.g. an option formula that has as its result half the Black-Scholes price, or twice the 
Black-Sholes price, would have succumbed in this way, just as, in fact, the practitioners' rules-of-thumb 
prior to Black-Scholes succumbed to Black-Scholes-based arbitrage (MacKenzie, personal 
communication). 
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performation.  Any act, even of language, produces effects that might strike back.  
The history of science is nothing but the long and interminable series of untimely 
overflowings, of socio-technical agencements that have been caught out, unable to 
discipline and frame the entities that they assemble.  Just as, through their very 
actions, a badly calculated boat, an ill-adjusted missile or a wrongly formulated 
theorem reveal unsuspected worlds, the Black and Scholes formula sets in motion 
events that without it would not have happened and that, once taken into account, lead 
to new socio-technical agencements. What is at stake is the success or failure of the 
performation, what is at stake is the realization of the socio-technical agencement 
inscribed in the statement.  
 
The notions of representation, convention or belief and, with them, that of self-
fulfilling prophecy, do not enable us to study failures because they give no principle 
of reality.  The Black and Scholes formula has a world to impose, socio-technical 
agencements outside of which it cannot survive.  A formula that would index share 
prices on sunspots (Guesnerie 1986) that is, that would be pure convention, would last 
no more than a second, simply because there is not a single element that can be 
mobilized to rapidly produce a socio-technical agencement linking sunspots to share 
prices in an observable and stable manner.  
 
Prescription 
The notion of "prescription" is not very far removed from that of "self-
fulfilling prophecy."  It is also frequently mobilized to describe the mechanisms 
through which a conformity between economic theory and economic reality is 
achieved.  Whereas self-fulfilling prophecies imply (similarly) formatted human 
minds ready to believe in the truth of certain categories or assumptions proposed by 
economic theories, prescription implies a medium, an intermediate device between 
theory and behavior, between economics and the economy.  Generally this medium is 
taken to be institutions and the norms that they impose (Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton 
2005).  Consider, for example, the role of economic theories and their hypotheses in 
institutional design.  We can say that the creation of a European central bank, directly 
inspired by the monetarist theses of Milton Friedman, helps to make real monetary 
markets correspond to the descriptions and analyses proposed by theories or models 
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qualified as abstract.  Likewise, enforcing incentives, inspired by economic theories 
and their assumptions about human or organizational behaviors, causes these 
behaviors to fit the theory's predictions.  When workers are paid on the basis of 
performance, they end up complying with the anthropological models that fit the 
incentives imposed on them.  If we consider that a firm is a nexus of contracts, and we 
set up procedures to make these contracts explicit and to ensure their enforcement, the 
firm does become a nexus of contracts.  One of the contributions of the prescription 
thesis is that it highlights the importance of what I have called socio-technical 
agencements in comprehending relations between economics and the economy.  To 
understand how statements become true and describe the world as we see it, one has 
to take into account institutions and the constraints and incentives that they impose.  
The difference between self-fulfilling prophecies and prescriptions is slim: from the 
point of view of prescription (as in that of self-fulfilling prophecy), economic theory 
says nothing about the real economy. Economics does not have to describe reality; its 
mission is to say what the economy is supposed to be and to propose solutions and 
devices to make it that way.  
 
Since it is often said that economics is prescriptive rather than descriptive, it is 
worth devoting a few lines to the difference between prescription and performation.  I 
am going to show that the notion of prescription denotes a particular case of 
performation.  
 
A convenient way of proceeding is via Sahlins who introduces the opposition 
between performative and prescriptive structures, in order to describe the attitude of 
Hawaiians who are reported to have offered Captain Cook and his crew the 
opportunity of having sexual relations with them (Sahlins 1985).  How can this type 
of behavior with strangers be explained?  Sahlins notes that the case shows, above all, 
Hawaiian society's faculty for invention when faced with the unexpected.  He argues 
that Hawaiian women showed their strong ability to adapt and to react when Cook and 
his crew landed, adding that these faculties of adaptation and change were 
nevertheless framed by references to well-established beliefs and norms that were not 
questioned.  If Cook was considered to be a God and Hawaiian culture encouraged 
women to have children with gods then Hawiians can be said to have adjusted to a 
new situation without disregarding the norms of their culture.  
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Based on this observation, Sahlins develops a more general reflection.  To 
account for this framed inventiveness, he proposes that some societies have 
performative structures,14 while others have prescriptive structures.  In the former, 
identities are performed by the actions undertaken by individuals (when they are in 
situations of uncertainty); in the latter, the actions are prescribed by cultural codes that 
imply well-established identities and roles: these are the cold, repetitive 
societiesdescribed by Radcliffe Brown.  
 
All in all, Sahlins considers that there is a dialectical relation between 
prescription and performation.  An unexpected event – in this case the arrival of those 
strange Englishmen – is interpreted in terms of existing categories (Cook is 
considered as a God) which prescribe behaviors and practices (the norm is that, since 
he is a god, the women should want to be pregnant by him) that perform Cook as a 
veritable god.  But the performation can be successful only if Cook – and especially 
his sailors! – fulfill the role ascribed to them, which is not the case.  Neither Cook nor 
the sailors behave as gods ought to.  In reaction to this inappropriate behavior, the 
Hawaiians then set about devising new categories and practices.  Hawaiian society is 
heated up again.   
 
Sahlins, almost unwittingly, shows us why the notion of prescription is futile. 
The distinction is not between prescriptive structures and performative ones, but 
between closed situations and open ones, between situations of repetition, where 
events that occur are known and treated as routine, and situations where events are 
unexpected (Cook arrived in Hawaii out of the blue) and trigger behaviors and 
analyses that tend to reduce them to known categories and events.  We can therefore 
say that Radcliffe-Brown-type societies, those that remain closed in on themselves 
because they aren't fortunate enough to cross paths with a Cook, have performative 
structures, just like Hawaiian societies and their unexpected encounters.  But in one 
                                                 
14 Sahlins uses the notion of performativity in a purely Austinian sense. Taking the example of 
friendship, and of assistance that a person in difficulty can expect from a supposed friend, he says that 
"the relationship is even more certainly created by the performance, than is the performance guaranteed 
by the relationship." 
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case the performance is repetitive: it is always the same roles, the same behaviors, that 
are enacted in identical situations; whereas in the other, when faced with unusual 
situations, it seeks adaptation, absorbs differences and turns them into novelties.  
Prescription is simply a particular case of performation, a borderline case 
corresponding to pure repetition, in what Sahlins rightly calls closed situations.  
 
The same applies to economics: it does not alternate between prescriptivity 
and performativity; it is always performative.  In certain cases the socio-technical 
agencements and the worlds corresponding to its models have ended up existing and 
producing recurrent events: for example, that share prices scrupulously follow a 
random walk.  When this type of adaptation occurs, the performation becomes a 
prescription.  But the performation may well fail, and the conditions of felicity may 
not be fulfilled.  In that case the existing agencements have to be rearranged or even 
profoundly transformed: what MacKenzie calls counter-performativity prevails.  The 
distinction therefore, is not between prescriptive structures and performative ones, but 
is rather between performations that manage to produce regularities and repetition, 
and performations that are constantly faced with unexpected events, that they 
sometimes absorb, but only sometimes, for a while.  The Hawaiians made a god out of 
Cook, but only for a while.  The market follows Black-Scholes, but only for a while.  
 
Expression 
Redefined by the pragmatic turn, the notion of performativity cannot be 
reduced to a mysterious mechanism (the "Fiat lux et lux fit" of the Old Testament15) 
which would cause the reality to which the statement refers to exist, without an 
addition of forces.  The notion of enunciation underscores the fact that any statement 
defines its context and has meaning only in relation to that context .  The question of 
the actualization of this context is therefore open.  Moreover, enriched by science and 
technology studies, the notion of enunciation takes into account materialities: the 
context is not reduced to institutions, norms or rules; it is a socio-technical 
arrangement.  Exit the idea that everything is a matter of language and that the 
performativity of statements is to be found only in the statement.  Neither the notion 
                                                 
15 A usual translation is: Let there be light and there was light.  
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of self-fulfilling prophecy nor that of prescription make socio-technical arrangements 
visible.  
 
The notion of expression, illustrations of which are found in the chapter by 
Didier (forthcoming), shares the same critique of the closely linguistic definition of 
performativity.  A statement does not create the object to which it refers ex-nihilo; the 
notion of performativity is relevant only if it is further refined by the pragmatic turn 
and the ANT turn.  Why not therefore opt for the notion of expression, rather than 
maintaining a term, performativity, that can be misleading? Despite frequent 
misunderstanding, I prefer the notion of performativity (and performation) to that of 
expression which might underplay the importance of the contribution of models and 
statements in the shaping of economies.   
 
The notion of expression does have the advantage of emphasizing that there is 
no tabula rasa.  Not everything is feasible.  The notion of expression guards against 
the idea that the economy could be created from scratch by economics.  Very specific 
work, new material arrangements, the implementation of tools such as shingling and 
the manipulations that these tools allow are necessary.  To produce merchandise from 
things that are not yet completely economicized, one has to do with what exists, edge 
one's way in, articulate.  This oblique work is highlighted by the notion of expression 
that shows the multiplication of elements and actants already there, who are involved 
and have to be taken into account.  The notion of expression is a powerful vaccination 
against a reductionist interpretation of performativity; a reminder that performativity 
is not about creating but about making happen.   
 
Employing the notion of expression nevertheless bears an inherent risk, that of 
overplaying material practices and leaving linguistic and textual practices in the 
background; in short, in our case of underestimating the models and elements of 
economic theory.  Didier's chapter illustrates these difficulties (Didier, forthcoming).  
On several occasions he evokes the out-thereness of the world and the innerness of 
subjects: the pickles are there, outside the statistics that apprehend them; the 
subjectivity of farmers, their beliefs and their convictions explain why statistics prove 
to be effective (p. 37).  The notion of expression tends constantly to recreate the 
divide between an object-reality that is expressed and the subject expressing it.  As for 
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the notion of performation, it has the advantage of focusing on a question that is 
essential: it refuses the distance between the object and the discourse about  it.  That is 
the inner meaning of the notion of an act of language.  When the mayor says: "I 
hereby pronounce your man and wife," he is not expressing something that is already 
there; he is making it happen.  And for that act to be successful, the appropriate 
agencements have to exist; the felicity conditions have to be met.  Caricaturally- and 
generally-speaking we could say that the economy does not exist before economics 
performs it, and that when economic (or economicized) elements are already there it 
means that economics (at large) has already been that way.  I prefer the risks of over-
interpretation of this statement (which can be pushed so far as to become a caricature: 
some criticize me for saying that economics creates the economy from A to Z!), rather 
than risking the under-interpretation favored by the notion of expression (the idea that 
there are economic practices per se which exist and existed before economics put 
words to them).  To be sure, it is unquestionable that things exist, that the discourse of 
economics, when successful, does not make the economy exist ex-nihilo! But to 
understand this process of economicization (Callon 1998) in which economics at large 
participates, it is preferable to use the concept of performation rather than that of 
expression which erases the process by which acts of language contribute towards the 
occurrence of radically new events. 
 
Expression is a crucial component of performation, but it is not all 
performation.  Talking of the combination, the association or the networking of 
existing elements, all concepts and metaphors that Didier uses, is insufficient.  I prefer 
the concept of socio-technical agencement and opt for a description of these 
agencements that includes, primarily but not only, the elements of theories, models, 
etc.  Each element of an agencement – and among these, hypotheses and models have 
to be included – contributes towards the performation of the whole.  The wedding 
ceremony is a socio-technical agencement that will demonstrate, for example, two 
beings' wish to be married.  But in that agencement the marriage pronounced by the 
official plays a crucial part: entangled with all the other elements composing the 
arrangement, it causes that which did not exist before to exist and to last, at least for a 




The above discussion has shown the interest of the notions of performativity 
and socio-technical agencement, including the statements that describe these 
agencements and contribute towards putting them into action. This analysis echoes the 
discussion by Annemarie Mol of the use of the notions of performativity and 
performance in sociology.  A long footnote in her book The Body Multiple is highly 
instructive in this respect: "When people present themselves to each other, Goffman 
said they present not so much themselves but a self, a persona, a mask.  They act as if 
they were on stage.  They perform." (Mol 2002) pp. 34-44).  We thus dissociate that 
which happens backstage and concerns psychology, from that which happens front 
stage and concerns sociology; the personal identity on the one hand and the public 
identity on the other.  Irrespective of the actor's adherence, the role she performs is 
therefore perfectly real and produces effects: it defines the social as such.  Authors 
like Judith Butler have extended Goffmanian reasoning: all roles are performances; 
there is no backstage or back office: "There need not be a 'doer behind the deed' but 
[…] the 'doer' is variably constructed in and through the deed" (Mol ibid.).  People's 
identities do not precede their performances, but are constructed in and through them.  
Butler is concerned about gender identity.  She maintains that this identity is 
constantly reconfigured and realized through accomplished acts.  We must therefore 
talk of contrasting identities as they are performed in a variety of sites and situations.  
Yet Mol is not convinced by the Butlerian analysis.  According to her, this conception 
brackets off the crucial role played in the production of identities by entities, such as 
the vagina, which have come to be considered as natural and therefore outside the 
social.  Even if the vagina does not make a woman, it contributes towards making her, 
at least in certain circumstances, just as the penis contributes towards the constitution 
of a man : "Bodies do not oppose social performances, but are part of them."  As 
showed by Hirschauer they are also reshaped, restyled, redesigned. 
 
It is because the notion of performativity has been linked to that of 
performance, which tends to ignore the socio-technical and especially the corporeal 
elements composing agencements, that Mol, wanting to avoid Butlerian-type 
culturalist excesses, proposes the notion of enactment.  Identity is a process: even 
though it is constructed, the construction has no end, it is constantly under way.  In 
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this approach, there is no reason to apply a different analysis to so-called objects. 
Criticizing the use – by sociology or by cultural (gender) studies – of the notion of 
performativity when it is equated to that of performance, Mol notes that: a) the 
(sociological or anthropological) analysis of the shaping of entities and of the 
expression of their identity must take into account so-called natural entities, the body 
for example and, more broadly, all the materialities composing what I call socio-
technical agencements; b) the identity of each entity, human or non-human (including 
the vagina), is never set for once and for all, definitively constructed: it is a flow.  
Situations of closure, as assumed by Sahlins, are not situations in which identities are 
mechanically prescribed.  As in situations of openness, they are under trial.  Stability 
is a constant struggle which stems from the involvement of but is not determined by 
materialities.  
 
Emphasizing the role of materialities- or of what I call socio-technical 
agencements, leads to the notion of performation. Statements and their world are 
caught in a process of co-evolution.  The Black and Scholes formula or the theory of 
general equilibrium, confined to the academic world, can find their appropriate 
milieu, their felicity conditions.  But when they move over to the Chicago derivatives 
exchange or to ministries responsible for economic planning, they may encounter or 
even trigger resistance, for their felicity conditions are not filled.  The socio-technical 
arrangements that would have enabled them to survive in these strange worlds are not 
present or prove to be difficult to put in place.  We can agree to call performation the 
process whereby socio-technical arrangements are enacted, to constitute so many 
ecological niches within and between which statements and models circulate and are 
true or at least enjoy a high degree of verisimilitude.  This constantly renewed process 
of performation encompasses expression, self-fulfilling prophecies, prescription and 
performance.  
 
Performation's Struggles  
The success (or the failure) of an act of language becomes clear only at the end 
of the tests to which it is put, through the cooperation it triggers, the oppositions and 
controversies that it generates.  Statements can survive and prosper in one particular 
place and at one particular time, and disappear in other places and at other times.  
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Within the academic world, marginalist analysis thrives without any problem.  As 
soon as it leaves that world of textbooks and the students that suits it so well, it gets 
into trouble. Yet marginalist analysis has not, for all that, been invalidated, simply de-
realized in some settings – which does not prevent it from surviving and even 
prospering in the academic world (at least in some US universities).  All of the 
economists who say that the unrealism of their propositions are of no concern to them, 
have chosen their world, a world of papers, colleagues and students: the one that suits 
their theories.  That is where they remain and do everything to ensure that it survives.  
On this note, it is to the process of adjustment of statements and their associated world 
(what I call the process of performation) that I will now turn.  
 
Economics at Large 
"The thread breaks when subjected to a force greater than its breaking 
strength"; "the human being is moved by her interests and knows her preferences and 
their hierarchy"; "the Black and Scholes formula gives the price of an option".  Each 
of these statements can survive and be taken into account only if accompanied by its 
own world: Its diffusion is possible only if the environment that the statement requires 
is available throughout its circulation and in all the places to which it leads.  To move 
a statement from one spatio-temporal frame to another and for it to remain operational 
(that is, for it to be capable of describing situations and providing affordances for 
them), the socio-technical agencement that "goes with it" has to be transported as 
well.  In the process of circulation of a statement there are tests and trials that will 
determine its realization or de-realization, the fact that it remains set in its original 
world or, alternatively, spreads out and spreads its world with it.  
 
Whether we are dealing with the natural or the social sciences, it is obviously 
very rarely the case that there is no doubt or ambiguity as to the world being 
mobilized by the statement.  Many rehearsals are required (that is the purpose of 
experiments and laboratories), many trials, to know what those worlds in which the 
statement will succeed are made of.  Under which conditions can two threads be 
considered as identical?  What exactly does the phrase "apply a force to a thread" 
mean?  What are the possible causes of the break?  Is the recording of the deformation 
not influenced by other phenomena?  Or: how can we construct the data needed to 
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calculate the price of a particular option?  How can the price obtained be used to 
negotiate a deal?  In which situations, with which equipment, does a human being 
become able to assess her own interests and to calculate them in such a way as to 
determine an optimal behavior?  All these questions are futile when statements remain 
confined to their paper world: it does not require more than a few words to mention 
the possibility of observations.  They become crucial and tricky when statements start 
to travel, to shift out of their initial location, to be translated from one frame to 
another.  
 
The full answer to these difficult questions is rarely known before many 
experiments and trials have been completed.  In other words, any shift of the 
statement reveals problems, causes the appearance of misfits, maladjustments, 
untimely overflowings.  During these successive displacements and the consequent 
trials, the statement's world becomes more complex.  Just as one discovers only 
progressively, through replications and movements, why an experiment succeeds (or 
fails), an equally long process is required to explore the socio-technical agencements 
that a statement or model needs to function in such-and-such a spatio-temporal frame 
(see the forthcoming chapters by MacKenzie and Holm).  In the paper world to which 
it belongs, marginalist analysis thrives.  All it needs are some propositions on 
decreasing returns, the convexity of utility curves, and so forth.  Transported into an 
electricity utility (for example Electricité de France), it needs the addition of time-of-
day meters set up wherever people consume electricity and without which calculations 
are impossible; introduced into a private firm, it requires analytical accounting and a 
system of recording and cost assessment that prove to be hardly feasible.  This does 
not mean that marginalist analysis has become false.  As everyone knows, it is still 
true in (most) universities.  
 
Between perfect adaptation and total inadaptation, there is a wide range of 
intermediate configurations.  Sometimes one simply has to amend statements, models 
and formulae to ensure their survival, by taking into account the reactions to their 
circulation in exotic and hostile places.  MacKenzie shows that, for it to have been 
able to absorb the crisis that showed it to be wrong, the Black and Scholes formula 
could have been amended, for instance by choosing Lévy-type probability 
distributions, rather than log-normal distributions.  This did not happen, because many 
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other programs were competing to impose other statements, other worlds and other 
socio-technical agencements.  The alternative proposed by Leland and Rubinstein 
("sunshine trading"), that would have made it possible to provide the Black and 
Scholes formula with an environment better suited to its functioning16, was finally 
excluded because the Chicago exchanges were opposed to "sunshine trading" and 
imposed their own solution. The performativity approach makes it possible to exhibit 
the struggle between worlds that are trying to prevail17; it makes the struggle for life 
between statements visible.  Each statement, each model, battles to exist.  But the 
Darwinian metaphor stops there.  In reality this struggle between statements is a 
struggle between socio-technical agencements.  It is not the environment that decides 
and selects the statements that will survive; it is the statements themselves that 
determine the environments required for their survival.  
 
By examining the confrontation between socio-technical agencements, we 
have to take into consideration statements other than those produced by scientists, in 
our case other than those produced by academic economists.  To understand the 
failure, from 1987, of attempts to adjust the financial world to the Black and Scholes 
formula (which, despite its partial de-realization, continues to survive, although 
hidden, since it is a part of the informational infrastructure of markets), we need to 
take into account the programs with which the formula  enters into competition.  
Some of them, probably the majority, are produced outside academic circles.  It is 
impossible to understand the effects of (academic) economics on the economy if we 
fail to consider it – with its statements, models and analytical tools – in the context of 
the struggles opposing it against all of the other actors who also perform the economy, 
format it, produce their own statements and models, and organize their own trials.  
 
Academic economics does not have a monopoly on performation.  It is only 
one possible source of transformation of the economy. Many historical studies 
emphasize the role of economist engineers (Hughes 1983) (Porter 1995).  The 
                                                 
16 “Sunshine trading […] could be seen as an attempt to repair the Black-Scholes world, to create a 
world in which the mere placing of 'informationless' orders did not affect prices” (MacKenzie 2004, 
p.323). 
17 In the following, I use the terms programs, worlds and socio-technical agencements interchangeably. 
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contribution of accountants, marketers and, more generally, market professionals has 
now been amply documented (Hopwood and Miller 1994; Clark and Pinch 1995; 
Power 1996; Cochoy 1998; Barrey, Cochoy and Dubuisson 2000; Strathern 2000; 
Kjellberg 2001; Cochoy and Grandclément 2005).  One might imagine that by shifting 
from the theoretician economists' world to that of practitioners (including economic 
agents themselves), we would change to another register, because it would no longer 
be a matter of economics but of regular engineering and social technology, and the 
notion of performation would  loose its relevance in the process.  But that is not the 
case.  
 
First, the distinction between science and techniques is often used only to 
disqualify certain practices (qualified as techniques), which are not fundamentally 
different from those considered to be theoretical and supposed to be the monopoly of 
academic research.  Preda gives a striking evidence of this (Preda forthcoming) when 
he shows that technical analysis or financial chartism, which developed alongside the 
use and diffusion of the stockticker, is entirely theoretical in the most classical sense 
of the word.  It produces concepts and interpretations, proposes models, clarifies 
causal relations and organizes experiments.  The so-called experimentalist economists 
who help to design spectrum auctions (see the chapter by Mirowski and Nik-Khah, 
forthcoming) produce as much theory as do game theorists.  In both cases the words 
"technique" (or "technology") and "theory" serve more to impose social hierarchies 
and scales of legitimacy than to describe practices and types of production18.   
 
Second, transporting a theoretical statement from one point to another and 
implementing it requires the intervention of new actors who will contribute to (or 
oppose) the actualization of the socio-technical agencements implied in the statement.  
These socio-technical agencements can be explored, created, tested and tinkered with 
only if engineers and practitioners are mobilized.  To make a formula or auction 
system work, one has to have tools, equipment, metrological systems, procedures etc.  
To establish relations that "exist" between monetary masses and price levels, to act on 
the one in order to control the others, there have to be institutions, systems of 
observation, codification and data collection, tools for analyzing large numbers, etc.  
                                                 
18 The situation is the same in physics: see Galison (1997) and Knorr Cetina (1999). 
 30
A host of professions, competencies and non-humans are necessary for academic 
economics to be successful.  Each of these parties "makes" economics. They are 
engaged in the construction of a world described and performed by statements and 
models that we readily agree belong to the world of economics, in the strict sense of 
the word.  The world conveyed by the statement is realized only after a long collective 
effort, which one could call economic research, involving 90% engineering and 10% 
theory.   
 
There is a third reason for expanding the meaning of the word economics: the 
statements and models that perform reality (in our case the economy) are not limited 
to the propositions formed like ordinary sentences ("the thread breaks", "the price rise 
is caused by variations in monetary masses and flows", etc.).  As the Black and 
Scholes example shows, a formula or equation effects the same articulation or 
performation as a statement in ordinary language, but with even more precision and 
effectiveness.  With the help of a few signs, the Black and Scholes formula 
encapsulates the financial market (its variables provide its constituent elements) and 
causes it to function (when one calculates the formula one obtains the market price).  
Applying the formula and calculating the price means making the world that the 
formula articulates and describes exist.19  Any tinkering with the formula can have 
considerable consequences because it changes the world that the formula is supposed 
to activate. It happens that practitioners are often producers of formulae.  Some, like 
accountants, are even specialized in this type of activity.  The formulae that they 
devise are not different from the statements and models of professional economists.  
And they have the same fate as classical linguistic statements: they can succeed or 
fail.  They are entirely economics, as I use the term, and as economics they perform 
the economy.  
 
What I have just said about formulae applies to operating methods, calculation 
tools and technical instruments.  They are statements like any others.  Like all 
                                                 
19 It is amusing to note the problems involved with putting into ordinary words a mathematically simple 
formula describing a new product conceived of by engineers rather than economists (Lepinay, 
forthcoming). The formula's signification is contained entirely in its calculation and in the result of that 
calculation.  
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statements (that which is stated can be an ordinary sentence, a formula or a technical 
device), they are "uttered", put into circulation, sent out, and like all statements they 
convey a world.  Rather than being made with words or reduced to simple equations, 
they are composed of tables, abacuses, pre-programmed series of operations, 
assemblages of silicon and software packages.20  The case of automation of the Paris 
Stock Exchange, analyzed by Fabian Muniesa, shows that behind the choice of 
quotation algorithms and data transmission procedures, it is the concept of an efficient 
and fair market that is at stake (Muniesa 2003). The decision to install electrical 
meters and the choice of the technical characteristics of meters imply an economic 
world that differs from the one in which such meters do not exist.  Madeleine Akrich 
has demonstrated this in detail in the case of an African country: conceiving of 
electrical meters and uttering them (putting them into circulation) means creating 
consumers, citizens, and a market for electricity (Akrich and Law 1996).  As she 
showed, the resistance triggered by the initiative was not resistance to change or to 
progress, but was a struggle against the economy of meters, that is, against a particular 
form of economy among many others that might exist.  Economics can be inscribed in 
the hardest technologies, and when they are put into circulation those technologies 
manage or not to impose their world.  
 
All in all, I simply apply to economics what everyone agrees with in respect of 
ordinary techno-scientific innovation: that it is collectives that innovate.21 In these 
collectives there is no point in opposing those who articulate statements to those who 
make them function.  Everyone does economics with different means, and through 
different modalities of enunciation (models, theorems, formulae or technical devices).  
I have suggested the term "economics at large" for this collective (joint) performation, 
this co-performation of the economy.  
 
                                                 
20 As MacKenzie shows, the Black and Scholes formula ends up being all that at once (MacKenzie, 
forthcoming). 
21 I could simply have referred to the work on innovation that highlights the role of non-academics and 
particularly the role of research in the wild, and of research collectives. For a recent illustration of this 
point see Hippel (2005). 
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Co-Performation as a Historical Process 
With the concept of performation, observable reality is considered as the 
temporary outcome of confrontations between different competing programs, 
including scientific ones.  The historical dimension of processes is emphasized, as 
well as the fact that history matters and that the economy and markets are the 
temporary and fluctuating result of conflicts and the constantly changeable expression 
of power struggles.  The history of these struggles is incorporated into markets, just as 
a living organism retains traces of its evolution.  As MacKenzie and Millo say in their 
description of the transformation of markets due to the application of the Black and 
Scholes formula: "By the late 1970s, then, Black and Scholes was widely used by 
CBOE (Chicago Board Options Exchange) traders, and in the 1980s it began to be 
incorporated into the CBOE's informational infrastructure.  Gradually, 'reality' (in this 
case empirical prices) was performatively reshaped in conformance with the theory" 
(MacKenzie and Millo 2003, p. 127).  Once it has been accomplished this 
incorporation is no longer challenged.  The Black and Scholes formula was 
transformed into an element of the market and of its functioning.  The theory has 
become part of the market.  But the story does not end there.  The skew calculation (at 
least in the US), coupled with the Autoquote system, adds an additional layer which 
enhances and alters existing performations, without challenging them.  There is 
nothing extraordinary about this historical process; it is no more than a trivial matter 
of lock-in and path dependency.  But instead of lock-in being produced by a hard 
technology, it is produced by a soft technology that directly concerns the market 
organization and the formatting of agents' calculative capacities (and that readily 
resorts to hard technologies to consolidate and perpetuate its effects).  The dead grips 
the living.  By taking the struggles between programs into consideration – what I have 
called co-performation of the economy by economics at large – enables us to study 
the incorporation of theories, statements and tools which, transformed into algorithms, 
into routines, become infrastructures and revive the possibility of a new cycle of 
performations and counter-performations.  
 
Marie-France Garcia's postscript to her article – an article (finally available in 
English in this volume) which was so useful to me for proposing the thesis of the 
performativity of economics – shows how actors can reformat a pure and perfect 
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competitive market (Garcia-Parpet, forthcoming). The performation of this perfection 
required heavy investments, so that ironically it ends up becoming more like the 
market described by economic sociology (in the manner of Granovetter or Fligstein).  
What seemed to be verified because it was actualized at a particular point in time and 
a particular place, is "de-realized" when circumstances change, that is, when other 
socio-technical agencements are established for a variety of reasons.  
 
The other chapters of MacKenzie, Muniesa & Siu (fortcoming) help to further 
our understanding of the historical process of co-performation of the economy by 
economics.  These chapters show the diversity of configurations, from a pure and 
simple complementarity of programs to their open opposition resulting in 
compromises, both within ‘confined (or academic) economics', and between ‘confined 
economists' and ‘economists in the wild'.  Since I use the word "economist" to denote 
all agents who participate in the analysis and transformation of economic markets, an 
economist may be an academic researcher whose job is to produce theories on the 
market and to collect data in order to demonstrate statistical regularities that reveal 
laws or causal links. He or she may also be the head of an international institution or a 
central bank who applies economic theories, sometimes enhancing them with his or 
her own analyses, for the purpose of making decisions or designing regulations or 
institutions. Or he or she may be a market professional who designs market devices, 
algorithms for comparing supply and demand. Finally, the economist may be a 
consumer union that sets up tests to qualify products.  
 
Having effaced the distinction between all these agents who participate in the 
analysis and collective configuration of markets (in a more or less abstract, more or 
less direct and professional way), and who cooperate simultaneously in the production 
of economics at large, I do find it convenient to distinguish between those working in 
laboratories and those engaged in scale-one activities. Thus I will introduce a new 
distinction between I call  "confined economists" and  "economists in the wild." 
 
Cooperative Performation 
Do Norwegian fishermen fit the anthropological model proposed by certain 
confined social scientists?  Are they calculative by nature and motivated by their own 
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interests?  Are they inclined to put their own welfare before the common good?  The 
history of fishing in Norway shows that the answers to these questions depend on the 
period under consideration.  Community regulation requiring powerful entanglements 
between human beings and the fish with which they live – entanglements that are so 
strong that the survival of the one depends upon that of the other – is obviously a 
falsification of the anthropological program that affirms the universality of selfish 
human beings.  Yet this does not allow us to say that the statement "human beings in 
general and Norwegian fishermen in particular are selfish, calculating beings" is false.  
History shows that it can become "true" if the circumstances change and if the 
environment needed by such a being starts to exist.  The history described by Holm 
(forthcoming) shows precisely how we go from one agencement to another, how the 
world supposed by neo-classical economics is actualized.  
 
This neo-classical agencement was made possible by the spectacular 
metamorphosis of fish, by what can be seen as nothing less than h their ontological 
mutation.  The initially invisible and slippery fish, to which it was difficult to attach 
property rights, were progressively transformed into identifiable, graspable fish that 
accommodated such rights.  They became "distributed" fish, which Holm suggests 
calling cyberfish.  Cyberfish are traceable, identifiable, predictable and controllable.  
They correspond to a new stage in the ongoing process of evolution of the species.  
This latest mutation has required a huge effort involving documentation, fleets of 
boats to observe catches, cohorts of statisticians to implement the models and make 
them work, airplanes for watching the fishermen, traceability tools so as not to lose 
the elusive fish along the way, international institutions and negotiations to ensure that 
the calculations were right and to take the "necessary" decisions.  To achieve all of 
this, it has been necessary to transform the dark and mysterious ocean into a 
transparent aquarium. When fishermen turn into homines economici, they are able to 
live well only when seas are reconfigured as aquariums.   
 
Without this new fish the Norwegian fisherpeople would not have been able to 
calculate their interests.  Once the cyberfish had been performed by the techno-
sciences (halieutics, marine biology, population dynamics) and by politicians, the 
scene was set for the entry of homo economicus.  Economics then, had only to 
propose the tradability of fishing quotas, for the Norwegian fisherman to become 
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calculative and selfish.  The convergence of techno-sciences, politicians and 
economics, and their co-performation of the fishing world, has resulted in the 
invention and "implementation" of a new cosmos inhabited by new animal and human 
species whose co-existence has been made possible.  This new cosmos is a radical 
innovation which is both destructive and creative.  Its case history shows that the 
contribution of economics is productive in so far as it participates in the actualization 
of a world in which it becomes or is true.  But this story also underscores the 
importance of the verb "to contribute" in the sentence: "economics contributes to the 
construction of the reality that it describes".  Without economics the market would not 
exist (it is the Individual Transferable Quotas –ITQ– concept that makes this market 
operational, and the fishermen's calculative and maximizing rationality cannot be 
investigated as long as this market does not exist).  Yet economics alone is not enough 
to make it exist.  It is also necessary to have all of the investments, models, 
observations, calculations and institutions so accurately described by Holm.  In short, 
the cyberfish is needed.  In this case as in many others, economics as such is 
necessary but not sufficient.   
 
The importance and specificity of what I have suggested calling ‘economics in 
the wild' are evident here.  Economics in the wild is not pure economics; it is mixed 
with engineering, life sciences and management science – its complexity and 
heterogeneity constitutes its strength and makes it irreplaceable.  But it is also about 
calculations, optimizations and the management of rare resources.  It is imbibed, and 
impregnated by the anthropological program of ‘confined economics'.  Moreover, as 
Holm so neatly puts it, there is constant traffic, continuous interaction, and endless 
coordination between those who perform the cyberfish and those who perform homo 
economicus.  The alliances that this cooperation implies and the agencements that it 
allows, obviously include the law.  Property rights support what has already been 
assembled and arranged.  As Mitchell shows in his chapter (forthcoming), and 
contrary to what is often said, property rights do not constitute the cornerstone of 
markets, nor do they provide the foundations on which it can be built.  
 
In a sense, Didier's story echoes that of Holm (forthcoming).  Didier focuses 
on a particular time in the process of reconfiguring a market and the different entities 
comprising it.  At the origin of this transformation we find not academic economists 
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but an economist in the wild concerned by pickles, whose obstinacy soon led to a 
reconfiguration of the pickle such that that it became a sort of cyber-pickle which was 
visible and could be counted.  
 
The performation of the cyber-pickle was achieved after a series of 
manipulations which perfectly illustrate the process of disentanglement/re-
entanglement that I explained in The Laws of the Markets.  Initially the farmer and his 
pickles could hardly be dissociated.  This close entanglement made the pickles 
invisible at a distance and precluded their circulation.  Gradually the pickle became 
autonomous; its ability to circulate increased.  Its standardization and the comparisons 
and aggregations that it allowed paved the way to its economicization and to that of 
the agents who produced, packaged, traded and consumed it (the farmers who filled in 
questionnaires on their production, the cooperatives who commercialized the pickles, 
the federal agencies that centralized the data and decreed regulations, etc.).  The stage 
had to be prepared for categories such as supply and demand to be enacted, for the 
market to be unified and for prices to be set in relation to the (aggregated) demand 
and the (aggregated) supply.  The basic categories of economics are present in this 
reconfiguration.  What is striking here, as in the case of Holm, is the cooperative 
aspect of these mutually complementary interventions.  Didier does not tell us the rest 
of the story, but we can imagine that an acceleration of the economicization became 
possible once this infrastructure was in place.  
 
Such cooperation and the irreversibilities that it produces are by no means 
ineluctable.  The co-performation of the economy by economics at large is not always 
plain sailing.  As Mitchell shows in his chapter, in Egypt, farmers have been 
successfully resisting programs inspired by neo-classical economics.  We will now 
turn to situations in which intersecting performative programs, rather than being 
openly complementary (as in the case of fish and pickles), clash and end up reaching 
compromises. 
 
Competitition Between Confined Economists 
Guala's work on the organization of spectrum auctions by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), as well as the follow-up by Mirowski & Nik-
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Khah (forthcoming), highlight situations in which different programs developed 
mainly by confined economists confront one another.  This is a particularly interesting 
case, primarily because it illustrates the increasing role of experimentation in market 
engineering (see below) but also because it describes episodes in which different 
programs clash and end up reaching a compromise.   
 
The story begins with the FCC's decision to discontinue traditional practices 
which consisted of granting communication spectrums on the basis of bilateral 
arrangements.   A government agency, the FCC's aims were multiple and partly 
contradictory since it wanted to reconcile economic efficiency, technological 
innovation and social justice.  To design the market for frequencies it understandably 
turned to economists privileging the most theoretical of them all, game theorists 
(GTs).  What makes this affair complicated and interesting is that the difficulties 
posed by the market in question caused these economists to recognize that that there 
were no  ready-made solutions at their disposal.  Known types of auction were ill-
suited to the nature of the goods and the multiple constraints imposed by the FCC: 
"Game theory supplied no global discipline with regard to the type of 
recommendation tendered." Game theorists could certainly contribute to auction 
design, either very formally by using explicit models, (for example to invalidate 
certain solutions), or more informally by applying tacit knowledge, know-how and 
informed intuitions.  But what they were unable to do was provide a turnkey solution.  
One of the reasons for their difficulty stemmed from the fact that auctioned goods are 
interdependent, a condition ignored by game theory.  
 
As in any acceptable innovation history, there was soon a proliferation of 
actors, all defending their own programs.  A point of key interest in this case is the 
fact that another family of economists, experimentalist economists (EEs), entered the 
game, simply because they were able to persuade the agency to launch real 
experiments using computer technology.   It was then that the story started to take 
unexpected turns.22  The socio-technical agencements proposed by the 
                                                 
22 For the analysis of these changes of direction, typical of any innovation process, see Akrich, Callon, 
and Latour (2002). 
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experimentalists coincided only very partially with those that should have been 
deployed to make the GTs's statements, models and recommendations actual.  
 
Mirowski & Nik-Khah (forthcoming) show the gap between the two worlds 
proposed by GTs and EEs. They show the depth of opposition between the 
anthropological programs and the socio-technical agencements presupposed by the 
different models proposed.  These differences related to the agents' assumed 
competencies (Are they capable of (Bayesian) learning or not?  Are they prepared to 
revise their preferences?), furthermore to the manner of conceiving of the role and 
effects of algorithms for organizing the encountering of goods and agents (EEs, who 
represent markets as combinatorial optimization procedures, are interested in "the 
attainment of a competitive equilibrium", while GTs represent markets as Bayes-Nash 
games).  Theoretical models lead GTs to favor "the increase of the amount of 
information provided to agents", while leading EEs "to seek improvements in the 
capacity for information processing".  Mirowski & Nik-Khah's striking translation of 
this opposition is as follows: for GTs, "the bidder who would create the most value 
from owning the license wins it", while for EEs, "the bidder who values the license 
the highest at the outset acquires it".  The differences can be summed up in this way: 
EEs think that it is the algorithms that do calculations, while GTs locate them in 
agents' heads.  Alternative theoretical positions cause the two groups to favor different 
organizations of auctions, two different socio-technical agencements.  EEs are in 
favor of combinatorial auctions while GTs support the idea of simultaneous-multiple-
round-independent auctions (SMRI).  Mirowski & Nik-Khah describe in detail the 
alliances formed between the multiple actors (operators, economists, federal agencies, 
etc.) engaged in the design of auctions.  In this history there are familiar elements, 
such as hierarchical relationships formed between theoreticians and experimentalists, 
or coalitions of interests between groups of scientists and economic or political actors.  
Economists are everywhere: everyone employs their own economist to defend the 
models assumed to be compatible with their economic and political objectives.  There 
is even a fierce struggle to attribute the success of the operation to a particular group, 
(in this case GTs proved to be the strongest and cleverest) a group which, as in any 
history of innovation, was simply one of the many protagonists responsible for the 
final design.  
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We would be unable to understand what was happening in the design of the 
FCC spectrum auctions if we reduced its history to a mere clash between existing 
interests.  All these actors, especially the economists, strive to construct the socio-
technological agencements that they believe are compatible with their own models, 
statements and assumptions.  To be in line with the overall argument I am putting 
forward here, and to avoid sociologizing or psychologizing interpretations, it would 
be more accurate to say that the confrontation takes place between socio-technical 
worlds that are struggling to exist, at the expense of other socio-technical worlds.  
What is original in this story is that none of the protagonists is able to push their own 
program through to the end, for none of them is able to completely frame the world 
that they create.  They can only adopt a logic of compromise in which some elements 
of their world are realized and others are not.  For example, EEs cannot avoid the 
adoption of the solution proposed by GTs (the Simultaneous Multiple Round 
Independent auction), but in the implementation of algorithms and procedures they 
reintroduce elements of their own world by imposing technical solutions drawn from 
experimentation that GTs initially exclude because they do not fit with their game 
theoretic models.  
 
In the final workable compromise, which translated into a socio-technical 
agencement consisting of bits and pieces, and which partially, but only partially, made 
the assertions of both GTs and EEs true, we find elements of the different competing 
socio-technical agencements.  The world that ended up existing was a patchwork, 
cobbled together with elements from competing worlds.  Of course there is no point in 
asking whether the models were true.  The only criterion is failure or success.  In this 
case of two rival programs the result was mixed.  But Mirowski & Nik-Khah are right 
to point out that other programs did not have the possibility of joining the struggle.  
The worlds excluded a priori are the losers in this affair.   
 
In the history of the spectrum auction an important role is granted to academic 
economists, whether they are GTs or EEs.  One of the advantages of the co-
performation concept is that it establishes a symmetry between all of the categories of 
economists.  Whether they are in the wild or confined, whether they state a formula, 
build a piece of software or devise an accounting technique, they all give themselves a 
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world or worlds so that the formula, model or software that they put into circulation 
(utter) finds an environment, agencements, enabling it to function.   
 
Competition Between Economists in the Wild and Confined Economists 
Preda examines the constitution of a theory of financial markets that was 
developed very early on, outside academic circles, and that was able to stand up to 
rival theories by being established as a theory in its own right (financial Chartism or 
technical analysis) (Preda forthcoming).  This "vernacular" theory, the product of 
authentic research in the wild and a clear illustration of the importance of the concept 
of economics at large, draws its strength from its previous and continuing capacity to 
make the world that it describes, and that makes it true, exist.  It is closely linked to 
the socio-technical agencements with which it interacts closely and tirelessly: to 
instruments (tickers) that make it possible to continuously record price variations and 
that produce those inscriptions, so useful to theoretical construction and to its 
performation; to professionals who specialize in the observation of those variations 
and in their interpretation; and finally, to users with interests and an identity that are 
well-established and taken into consideration.  This world is closely linked to the 
tracing of price variation curves, and therefore to tickers.  Without this technology for 
representing markets (curves traced with data from the ticker are both real and 
artifactual), the very idea of transforming forms into instruments of analysis and 
interpretation would be inconceivable.  These inscriptions impose a principle of 
reality; they constitute an obligatory point of passage, a perfectly material reality to be 
taken into account.  Chartism is not reducible to a convention; nor is it reducible to a 
belief or even a superstition outside the market that would enable it, once diffused and 
shared, to coordinate actors by making their expectations possible.  It is not 
disconnected from the market; it is articulated to socio-technical agencements that 
produce the traces that it uses to describe the world in which it is a participant and on 
which it will, in turn, make it possible to act.23 The curves to interpret are there.  
Analyzed by the chartists, they belie the hypotheses in terms of which price variations 
are correlated with political or economic events.  As tools of refutation in a Popperian 
                                                 
23 Inscriptions are crucial elements in the chain of translations which organize the shifting out and the 
shifting in of scientific statements (Latour 1987). 
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style, they furthermore make it possible to affirm the existence of regularities, of 
collective patterns, where others talk of random walk.24  These theoreticians in the 
wild are often engineers, well trained in statistics, and they invent concepts to reveal 
regularities hidden by sudden movements: the normal line concept, for example, 
describes underlying trends hidden by short-term variations.  The ticker and its curves 
are an intellectual technology which enables the human mind to see things that it is 
otherwise unable to see and to conceive of (Goody 1977).  An epistemic community is 
formed, manuals are written and disseminated, traders are turned into users of these 
techniques and of this knowledge.  Preda concludes that: "technical analysis becomes 
simultaneously a theory of financial markets, a theory-based technique for forecasting 
prices, a set of instruments, a commodity sold by the members of the group, a 
commodity around which data processing firms emerged, a media discourse, and a 
narrative".  Financial chartism is being actualized.  As its world is unfolding, groups, 
techniques, inscriptions and courses of action are becoming necessary.  Theory 
performs in the precise sense that I have given to this term.  And what explains the 
deployment of this world is the ticker and its circulation.  As shown by Preda, the 
theory underlying technical analysis is highly elaborate. It was only with the Black-
Scholes-Merton model that academic science reached the level of this theory in the 
wild, that is, not equally true, but powerful enough to make a world exist, its own 
world, one that is able to withstand the comparison with the world of tickers and to 
enter into a performation struggle. 
 
Convergences? 
The cases analyzed in this book correspond to situations in which the different 
programs that participate in the performation of the economy eventually prove to be 
compatible, even if they differ on a number of points.  Just as the question was 
formerly posed of the so-called convergence of industrial societies – whether socialist 
                                                 
24 Preda notes that those who, like Bachelier, maintain that the probability clause is adapted to price 
analysis, are precisely the same ones who had no instrument for observation and recording. Without the 
adequate technology, they were in a sense limited to the probabilistic hypothesis. 
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or capitalist – we can now pose that of the convergence of performating economics – 
whether academic or in the wild.25  
 
The thesis that I would like to present in this section is the following: a certain 
sort of convergence exists and is organized around an anthropological program that is 
not very different from the neo-classical one (broadly speaking).  This explains why 
common sense refers to "the market economy" to talk about the economy, and why 
notions such as "neo-liberalism" are currently used to capture what seems to be an 
overall logic.  
 
I will argue that this shared anthropological program has three main features.  
1) It promotes the disentanglement of things and humans; 2) it asserts the centrality of 
individual human agencies; and, finally, 3) it tends to underplay the uneven 
distribution of calculative equipments and capacities amongst agencies.  
 
Disentanglements (and Re-Entanglements) 
The different chapters in MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu (forthcoming) all 
recount stories of disentanglement through which, with growing force and clarity, a 
world exists in which entities are transformed (and retransformed) into things and 
then goods (Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa 2002) that can circulate, passing from 
hand to hand, alternating between detachments and (re)attachments, and in which a 
deep divide has been created and maintained between these objectified things and the 
generally human agencies that produce, exchange and consume them.  
 
Holm analyzes the mechanisms through which two new beings were 
simultaneously brought into existence: the cyberfish and its (ocean) bedfellow, the 
Norwegian economicus fisherpeople.  This performation started with an initial series 
of disentanglements that broke up the fishing community - a community in which fish 
and fishermen had coexisted, attached to one another- until they became strangers.  
The fish were disentangled from the sea in which they had always hidden.  They were 
                                                 
25 Convergence must be understood as the construction of more or less extended compatibilities and not 
as the elimination of any difference. 
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reduced to bar codes, quotas that could be sold and taken advantage of, "stocks" of 
populations to conserve and develop, a dissuasive weapon in international power 
struggles.  At many junctures, economics intervened decisively in this process.  It 
allied itself with the forces that performed these new ontologies, bringing in its own, 
strategic one when it was a matter of organizing markets, that is, of attaching 
appropriately formulated property rights, creating the relevant incentives, and defining 
control procedures and devices.  The selfish (fish)erman could then develop and 
prosper.  This performation is no more miraculous than is the fishing that it allows. 
Didier in a story reminiscent of Cronon's work on the market in "futures" on grain 
(Cronon 1991), likewise describes the manipulations that allowed the constitution of 
the cyber-pickle (albeit a cyber-pickle produced by technologies that predate the 
digital computer) and that so marvelously illustrate the required disentanglements.  As 
time goes by the divide between calculative agencies and calculable goods grows 
wider and establishes a market based on an anthropology well described by 
economics, especially neo-classical economics.  It is clearly a convergence that is 
announced and initiated here.  
 
A series of disentanglements is also found in the history of spectrum auctions.  
The first disentanglement was the one wanted by the FCC which imposed a reshaping 
of all the old Mafia-like networks within which licenses were granted.  In the terms of 
economic sociology à la Polanyi-Granovetter, the auction aimed to disembed firms 
and administrations, and to bring new interests into play.  The second disentanglement 
brought GTs and EEs into contact and triggered a lot of controversies.  The definition 
(which I call "qualification") of goods to be auctioned generated debate.  The question 
was whether to disentangle the frequencies that applied to different geographical 
areas, and consequently to multiply goods (GTs), or rather to entangle them in order 
to form a single good (EEs).  The GTs won the battle and pushed the disentanglement 
process a step forward, deploying the market world further and further.  Without 
economics (that of GTs) this deployment would have been simply unimaginable.  
 
Financial markets also supply numerous examples of this convergence that 
deepens the disentanglement (re-entanglement) mechanism and allows the production 
of things and goods.  For a long time and until recently, options were seen as barely-
disguised forms of gambling.  Their development has perpetually been submitted to 
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scrutiny on moral grounds.  Millo has shown how these financial products were 
gradually disentangled from such moral issues and dissociated from gambling (Millo 
2003).  MacKenzie notes that with the Black-Scholes-Merton model this 
disentanglement is complete.  The Black-Scholes formula defends the legitimacy of 
the very idea of an options market, on which rational calculations can be made.  It 
imposes the market that it describes, by transforming options and derivatives into 
economic goods whose prices can be calculated objectively.  The accusation of 
gambling and immorality automatically falls away.  MacKenzie adds – and this point 
is strategic – that a difference is thus created: the new market is different from the 
preceding one.  Economists do not simply legitimize, reveal or express practices and 
existing models: "The Black-Scholes-Merton model did more than simply express 
price patterns that were already there.  The use of models altered price patterns […]."  
Of interest from the point of view of convergence, under consideration here, is the 
fact that a competing economics, born before and outside academia (an economics in 
the wild), helped to lay the ground by furthering this disentanglement.  The economics 
in question was chartism, the history of which has been studied in detail by Preda.  
Apart from competition between the two forms of economics (Chartism assumes the 
existence of significant regularities in the forms of price variations, whereas the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model posits a random walk), there is profound agreement on 
the economic nature of options (which no longer risk being likened to gambling).  
This might explain why chartist practices are still being used in the field, in parallel 
with or as a complement to the Black-Scholes-Merton model.  
 
These cases indicate how economics plays a crucial role in making this 
convergence possible and in accelerating and finalizing it.  All in all, what dominant 
economics does, in close collaboration (even when it is conflicting) with the leading 
productive forces of modernity that the natural sciences are, is to perform 
disentanglements which cause market goods to proliferate while dissociating them 
from the agencies that are in a position to produce and trade them (for a wonderful 
historical analysis of such a process see Mitchell 2002).  
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Human Individual Agencies  
It is not enough to separate goods and agencies.  One also has to profile the 
latter, and the options available for that profiling are obviously multiple.  A second 
feature common to most performative programs of economics (confined or in the 
wild) is that they share an identical choice, that of producing individual human 
agencies capable of calculating their interests in one way or another.  They tend to 
localize agencies in (individual) human corporeal envelopes and to equip them with 
tools, instruments, prostheses (obviously distributed but under the control of particular 
individuals) and rights, enabling them to construct something like individual interests 
(likened to income, indexes of satisfaction or welfare, or degrees of recognition of 
their legitimate dignity), and granting them the resources to calculate them.  What 
"human" means in the term "the human being" is the outcome of co-performation in 
which economics plays a key part. The human being is not a starting point.  
 
The "individualization of the agency", that is, the performation of a self-
interested agency obsessed by the calculation-optimization of his or her own interest, 
is clearly visible in the case of the Norwegian fisherpeople.  Petter Holm shows that 
once all the scientific, material, technical and institutional investments have been 
made to transform the sea into an aquarium and the wild fish into a cyborg fish, the 
ground has been cleared for the conception and construction of a market in which 
fishermen are transformed into selfish individual economic agencies.  The 
convergence is evident here: an implicit agreement exists between different groups of 
professionals, experts, institutions, scientific disciplines, and public national and 
international bodies, to enact this anthropological model.  
 
The same convergence can be observed at a micro level in the economic 
experiments analyzed by Mirowski and Nik-Khah (forthcoming).  Economists (GTs 
or EEs) as well as federal agencies share the same general hypotheses: the agent has 
preferences (whether they are revisable or not) and the challenge is to equip that agent 
so that s/he is able to calculate and defend them as well as possible.  Each player is 
thus supported by their computers, algorithms and favorite economists! This 
convergence is even clearer in the case studied by Lepinay (fortcoming): 
mathematicians, financiers, engineers and traders calculating with their bodies all 
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contribute in their own way towards the production of a calculation that enables them 
to qualify and price a disentangled product.  
 
At this point we need to consider a question raised by MacKenzie and Millo 
(2003).  They say that certain selfless behaviors of traders (who agree to integrate into 
their calculation a parameter – skewness – whose value is supplied by a designated 
primary market maker, and to refrain from engaging in free-rider strategies that would 
enable them to increase their profits) can be explained only by means of conventional 
economic sociology.  These traders behave in a moral way, with a sense of solidarity, 
because they are entangled in social networks and communities.   
 
Hence, MacKenzie's question: "How should we theorize the articulation 
between performativity and markets seen as networks, culture and moral 
communities?" (MacKenzie and Millo 2003).  Reset in the terms of this book 
(MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu, forthcoming), the question becomes: does the 
convergence of anthropological programs not encounter limits?  Can it go so far as to 
produce a monolithic agency that is entirely calculative, to the point of imposing a 
homo economicus who is so well framed that he no longer overflows?  MacKenzie 
and Millo's answer to this question is a resounding ‘No': "With the aid of economic 
theory, of technology and of much else, a passable version of homo œconmicus can 
be and has been configured cognitively, so to speak.  Whether he can be configured 
morally, out of real men and women, remains an open question" (p. 141).   
 
MacKenzie and Millo are right to answer in the negative.  Humans in their 
somatic envelope, made of neurons, genes, proteins and stem cells are constantly 
overflowing.  A total, unambiguous configuration is impossible.  There is always a 
remainder, something that hasn't been taken into account.  But this must obviously not 
lead us to consider that moral behaviors are not framed and arranged in the same way 
as selfish ones. What MacKenzie and Millo observe is that the trader alternates 
between different framings, passing from one configuration of agencements to 
another.  The question that they ask seems to be able to be formulated as follows: how 
can traders' alternation between calculative and non-calculative agencements be 
analyzed and described?  This question is largely unexplored, but partial answers have 
been proposed.  First, the symmetry between selfish and altruistic agencements has 
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been shown; both involve material, textual, procedural and other investments.  When 
homo economicus becomes altruistic "again", he does not rediscover his true nature; 
he changes his equipment.  Second – and this point is even more fundamental – 
calculative and non-calculative agencements are mutually interwoven.  Thus, they 
cannot be conceived of as exogenous, exclusive or even hostile.  They share elements, 
which makes alternation resemble the cross dissolves in the movies: non-calculation 
implies elements of calculation and vice-versa.  In other words, there are no economic 
markets without moral agencements; or, conversely, any altruistic agencement is 
calculated (Callon and Law 2005).  In any case, the question is crucial for the 
performativity program: the anthropology of economics is constantly confronted with 
other, equally performative, anthropological programs.  
 
Finally, this work of performation of individual agencies and their calculative 
capacities translates – and this is a strong point of convergence – into a very high 
level of asymmetry between those individual agencies which are almost totally 
deprived of the prostheses and rights that would enable them to negotiate, calculate 
and defend their interests, and those which, by contrast, have immense calculative 
capacities.  This inequality is due to the fact that performation of the economy by 
economics is always a co-performation, and that the programs represented in co-
performation favor the agencies whose competencies are already firmly established.  
(A history of economics should be written, which shows up the mechanisms through 
which the strongest agencies – that is, the best equipped – become stronger by 
performing the very world in which they can thrive.)   
 
Unequal calculating capacities 
We have shown (Callon and Muniesa 2005) that economic markets are better 
described as collective calculating devices where socio-technical algorithms organize 
and, very often, facilitate encounters between agents endowed with unequal 
calculating capacities.  The recent dissertation that Koray Caliskan devoted to the 
functioning of the global cotton market illustrates this point. It shows how dominant 
economic agents design and impose modalities of encountering, and consequently 
socio-technical algorithms of pricing that produce asymmetries and guarantee the 
domination of certain agencies over others.  These asymmetries, Caliskan tells us, can 
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be explained by means of the notion of prosthetic prices (Caliskan 2005).  At any 
point in time a large number of different prices exist in the cotton market.  In the 
transactions that occur on various sites (in the Turkish or Egyptian countryside, in 
Izmir or Alexandria, or in the New York Board of Trade) certain agents have access 
to a wide range of existing prices that they transform into "prosthetic prices", that is, 
into inputs into a calculation that only they master and that enables them to decide on 
the price in the transaction in which they are engaged.  The strongest agent is the one 
who can play with the largest number of prosthetic prices to calculate and set the price 
of the transaction.  Caliskan notes that this calculative capacity is unequally 
distributed.  The Egyptian farmer is soon submerged; the price he offers is reduced by 
his interlocutor to a prosthetic price among many others, and he loses control. He is 
calculated by one stronger than he as he delivers his bales of cotton, and at the same 
time he is rendered incapable of choosing another partner  
 
These asymmetries, that scale-one markets produce and reproduce, are at the 
centre of the negotiations and compromises punctuating the design and 
implementation of the electronic economy.  Muniesa, analyzing the automation of the 
Paris Stock Exchange, has shown that the choice of computer algorithms and digital 
equipment constantly raised questions of accuracy, fairness, transparency and equity.  
Existing balances of power frequently lead to options that favour certain asymmetries.  
Bergstrom and Mellet have shown how the technologies used to make labour markets 
more transparent or to "rationalize" calls for tenders (in the case of B2B markets), 
could sometimes deliberately result in an inversion of the balance of power between 
suppliers and buyers, just by reallocating calculating capacities (Mellet, Marchal and 
Rieucau 2005) (Lindberg and Bergström 2005).  
 
The different anthropological programs developed – sometimes concurrently 
but very often in a convergent way – by economics at large and in particular by the 
different professionals and experts who equip markets, tend to overlook inequalities in 
calculating equipment and even more frequently are actually busy trying to produce 
such inequalities. They likewise disregard or even worse promotes the fact that the 
organization of encounters, for instance between buyers and suppliers, directs badly-
equipped agencies towards well-equipped ones.  In the bracketing off of these issues, 
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economics particularly in its most abstract and formal parts has played and still does 
play a decisive role in producing and reproducing inequalities.  
.  
* 
*       * 
 
This triple convergence (a disentanglements of goods and agencies, a shaping 
of individual agencies, either an ignorance or production of uneven distributions of 
calculating capacities), does not lead to the imposition of homogeneous markets.  It 
does nevertheless impose a certain form of economy that, increasingly, is reduced to 
nothing but a question of "the" market and tends to confuse the possible plurality of 
markets and forms of competition with an anthropological model that is highly 
compatible with neo-classical economics.26  
 
Behind convergence, divergences obviously exist.  As shown in great detail in 
the different chapters of this book, actual markets are heterogeneous assemblages that 
are integrated to a greater or lesser degree and are always capable of disassembling 
locally.  The good news is that there is no overall logic, thanks to the struggles of 
performation.  It is precisely these power struggles between competing programs 
which make the disassembling and reassembling process possible, necessitate 
investments that measure up to those by which actual markets were formatted.  Only 
carefully prepared and organized experiments can achieve such a concentration of 
resources.  They form an obligatory point of passage for a perpetually local 
production and exploitation of differences.   
 
On Economics Experiments  
The failure of so-called planned economies has contributed to free us of the 
belief in Kapitalism and of the myth of Revolution as the only alternative.27  We are 
                                                 
26 This model assumes the obviousness of the three elements described in this section (Non 
human/human divide; individual agency; competition between equal agencies).  
27 I use the word Kapitalism, with a capital K, to denote the reality imagined by everyone who 
considers the Western economic system to be a homogeneous reality, endowed with its own logic. The 
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no longer in a period when the only choice was between a program aimed at 
performing an entirely state controlled economy, and a symmetrical, equally 
monolithic, program of performation of self-regulated markets. It is time indeed, as 
Gibson-Graham suggests, to unpack the notion of markets as self-regulated 
institutions and to think of projects in which models or programs are experimented 
with for constructing multiple axes of economic diversity (Gibson-Graham 2003). 
Future societies will probably have to be pluralistic in all of their organizations, 
including the economy.  There is no pre-given path to follow. Saying that the 
economy is performed by economics (at large), means implicitly highlighting the 
existence of a plurality of possible organizations of economic activity and of several 
programs than can be conceived of and tested, that is (co)performed. The notion of 
performation leads to that of experimentation. 
 
Experiments can be organized in many ways. A first strategy consists of 
choosing the laboratory as a starting point. Guala's chapter perfectly illustrates this 
point (Guala, forthcoming).  For him, the remarkable development of experimental 
economics in recent years has gone hand in hand with its the profound evolution. 
Initially designed to test the hypotheses of academic economics, experimental 
economics has gradually turned into an institution-building program.  As Guala notes, 
it is by becoming aware of its performative dimension that experimental economics 
accomplished this transformation and is now both legitimate and influential.  
"Building new institutions" means aiming at constructing what I have proposed to call 
socio-technical agencements.  That means also organizing trials of strength in order to 
validate assumptions and to enact procedures.  The looping process can then take 
place; new hypotheses can be tested, new socio-technical agencements proposed and, 
in return, lessons learned that revive theoretical analysis. The design of laboratories 
where new forms of economic activities can be tested and experimented is a strategic 
site for those interested in the performativity thesis.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
assumption of a homogenous economic reality is made by those who criticize capitalism, thus defined, 
as well as by those who defend it by talking of the market and its laws, in general. Experiments in the 
past decades have shown that Kapitalism could only be a fiction: no program has managed to make 
Kapitalism exist nor to overthrow it. There are only capitalisms; see Barry (2004). 
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Economic experiments include experimental economics, as redefined by 
Guala, but are obviously not restricted to it.  Gibson-Graham (2003) describes in 
detail experiments in the wild aimed at constructing cooperative economies and an 
economics of cooperative actions.  The Mondragon cooperative, constantly criticized 
from all sides, devised and applied original rules and devices that inspired 
experiments in other countries.  The organizational innovations that were tested and 
progressively enhanced took into account a series of requirements, real terms of 
reference: choosing products that would link the cooperative to the regional economy; 
defining rules for calculating the surplus production and its distribution; testing 
original forms of savings.  These innovations in the field were made, it seems, without 
the help of academic economists and sometimes even against them! The strategy 
followed was to abandon the project of substituting a new form of economy for 
another (replacing Kapitalism), and instead creating sustainable niches.  The 
cooperative does not propose the alternative solution to a general problem but a 
particular solution to a series of very specific problems.  In so doing it does not help 
to strengthen the illusion that global forms of organization of the economy exist.  The 
thesis of performativity pays justice to these strategies which strive to experiment 
with new settings, new forms of agencements, and which raise the question of their 
transpositions. 
 
Moreover, by inviting us to consider actual economic organizations as the 
outcomes of explicit or implicit performation struggles, the performativity thesis 
incites us to get rid of epistemological considerations and to adopt a more pragmatic 
stance. Mitchell's chapter perfectly illustrates how the change that Guala sees in 
experimental economics could be extended to in vivo experiments and economics in 
the wild (Mitchell, fortcoming). Property rights theory is one of the cornerstones of 
neo-classical theory and of … de Soto's program.  Instead of privileging epistemology 
(is neo-classical economy true or wrong?) and considering the (relative) failure of this 
program as a proof of its lack of realism, Mitchell describes it as the unpredictable 
outcome of a battle between two opposite (performative) programs, i.e. as an (even if 
involuntary) actual scale one experiment. Lessons can be drawn from this (unequal) 
trial of strength, in particular about the assumption of the existence of clear 
boundaries between markets and non-markets and also about the role of property 
rights in "formatting a form of exclusion-inclusion" by causing property transfers 
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from the poor to the rich.28 By highlighting the confrontation between two property 
rights theories, one produced by confined economics and the second by economics in 
the wild, Mitchell's chapter invites us to go further and to raise the more general 
question of the emergence, conditions of survival and extension of certain forms of 
economy that are born outside academic circles and that illustrate the inventiveness 
and audacity of economists in the wild specially when they are confronted with 
stubborn professional economists.   
 
The variety of experiment's sites and forms of organization – as illustrated by 
Guala's and Mitchell's studies (forthcoming) of very contrasted settings – raises the 
question of their typology. The chapter by Muniesa and Callon (forthcoming) 
proposes several analytical categories to grasp the diversity of modalities of 
experimentation, linked to different types of economics at large.  They thus 
distinguish three types of site for experiments: laboratories, platforms, and in vivo 
experiments.  They note that an interesting question is that of the choice of a 
particular type of site, but also of the categories of problems that are posed.  One of 
the challenges for the future, they tell us, is the networking of these sites and its 
organization. 
 
This networking should probably facilitate the cooperation/confrontation 
between different populations of economists, including confined economists and 
economists in the wild. Why not conceive of economists in the wild, who have been 
running experiments on cooperative economy for decades, conducting laboratory 
experiments in cooperation with academic economists, for instance to test different 
rules of distribution of surplus or different modalities of setting wages? Gibson-
Graham (2003) points out for example the "lack of an appropriate economic analysis 
for building new cooperative economics" and more particularly "the 
underdevelopment of an economics of surplus labor distribution." Why not envisage, 
symmetrically, that laboratory economists may be invited to continue their work in 
vivo, or even to start it in vivo where relevant.  These joint experimental networks 
should facilitate the appearance and evaluation of a wider diversity of forms of 
                                                 
28 See also Elyachar and her analysis of NGO's micro-lending programs in Egypt (Elyachar 2005). 
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organization of economic activities29 and introduce within academic economics more 
theoretical variety. Convergence will be no longer our only fate. 
 
The territory that is opening up to the social sciences is vast.  All the social 
sciences, not just economics, can contribute to this research program, alongside the 
agents engaged in economic activities (Barry and Slater 2005).  We no longer have to 
choose between interpreting the world and transforming it.  Our work, together with 
the actors, is to multiply possible worlds through collective experimentations and 
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